CHINA'S CURRENCY REFORM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE by Matsuoka, Koji
Title CHINA'S CURRENCY REFORM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
Author(s)Matsuoka, Koji










THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
IN 
THE IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY OF KYOTO 
VOLUME XI 
1936 
PUBLISHED BY THE DEl'ART)IENT 
011' ECONOMIC; IN 
THE IMPKRIAL UNIVERSITY 011' KYOTO 




CHINA'S CURRENCY REFORM AND ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China, after the commencement of the twentieth century, 
endeavoured to effect a currency reform, especially through 
discussions on the problems of treaties, foreign trade and 
indemnities, but failed to realize its object. The phenomenal 
rise of the price of silver during the World War seemed to 
offer an excellent opportunity for effecting this reform, but 
the opportunity was allowed to slip away. It was in 1929 
that Dr. E. W. Kemmerer proposed a currency reform in his 
.. Project of Law for the Gradual Introduction of a Gold 
Standard Currency System in China ". After this, the cur-
rency reform question was neglected for a time, in the midst 
of the .prevailing world depression, especially that which has 
corne from the collapse of the gold standard system in many 
countries. The policy of the United States to purchase silver, 
put into effect since 1934, has caused the most obvious out-
flow of silver from China, to the consternation of tbe opti-
mistic silver men who had never dreamed of such a conse-
quence, and has thereby intensified the depression of Chinese 
economy :md given rise to the present currency reform, 
which may be regarded as a life buoy thrown at Chinese 
economy adrift in the sea of economic crisis, or as the cul-
mination of a long-drawn struggle for bringing about the 
desired currency reform ever since the end of the last cen-
tury, especially since 1902. 
It should be noted in this connection that the present 
currency reform. important as it is. did not come as the 
result of the endeavours of Chinese economy itself but was 
born of the intensified world depression and particularly of 
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the great confusion in the political and economic world of 
the Far East. This fact promises many dubious issues 
regarding the future of the currency system of China and 
presents many perplexing problems concerning the develop-
ment of the capitalist system of economy. 
The function of the gold exchange standard and the 
development of the capitalist system of economy have been 
discussed throughout the world. In the Orient, however, 
this question has been treated as a colonial currency ques-
tion. This is true of the Netherlands East Indies, British 
India, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, and French 
Indo·China. Japan and Siam are the only independent 
nations in the Orient that have some direct connections with 
this system. China has painfully struggled to cope with this 
problem since the last century, especially since 1902, and 
the road she trod was much more thorny than that of either 
Japan or Siam. At one time the support of the Powers 
seemed very hopeful but China's internal disunity made last-
ing international support impossible. No fundamental cur-
rency reform had been effected, and China had to be satisfied 
with the adoption of reforms of minor importance, the 
following being some of the more notable ones: the silver 
yuan standard of the Ching Dynasty adopted in 1910 which 
foreshadowed the adoption of the gold standard; the silver 
yuan standard of the Revolutionary Government, adopted in 
1914; and the revised silver yuan standard of 1935. 
Many other currency reforms have been tried, some of 
which were suggested by Japan. The fact remains, however, 
that all proposals that were actualized as practical legislation 
were strictly confined within the premises of the silver 
standard. For instance, Tsao Iu-Iin's plan in 1918 for the 
adoption of the gold exchange standard was very timely, 
but the personal disharmony of Chinese leaders wrecked it. 
A similar plan advanced by Dr. Kemmerer was rejected 
and considered as impracticable, in spite of his great fame 
as an undisputed authority on the gold standard. But the 
unexpected pressure brought to bear on Chinese economy by 
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the United States' policy of purchasing silver, resulting in 
agricultural panic, made it inevitable for China to adopt the 
gold exchange standard, The circumstances which have led 
to China's adoption of the gold exchange standard are thus 
different from those of the Far Eastern colonies I have reo 
ferred to and from those of both Japan and Siam, which are 
independent nations, Two factors, namely, the intensified 
world depression and the American silver policy, solved the 
problem of Chinese currency reform as if by a single stroke. 
The reform of Chinese currency treated as a Far Eastern 
problem is different from that of the aforementioned colonies. 
It will be recalled that Japan, as an independent nation, was 
able to adopt the gold exchange standard by using a war 
indemnity and that Siam, another independent nation, sue· 
ceeded in her domestic economy in oppOSition to the inter· 
ference of foreign capital. China, on the other hand, had long 
anticipated the necessity of adopting the gold standard, but 
her economic policy, both in its domestic and its external 
aspects, had to travel the road of vacillation, until she became 
no longer able to withstand the heavy pressure of the world 
depression and that of a foreign economic policy, which to-
gether at last forced her to adopt the gold exchange standard. 
The recent currency reform by China did not come from 
any use she made of the normal development of her own 
capitalist system of economy. It is a step China was forced 
to take in order to combat the unprecedented depression in 
her economy. In other words, it was the last measure left 
to China which is an object of the economic development 
of Western capitalist countries. 
I shall trace the history of China's currency reform in 
sections and elucidate the significance of the recent reform. 
II. THE HISTORY OF CURRENCY REFORM 
IN CHINA 
As has been already stated, the question of Chinese 
currency reform became an active issue after 1902, but as 
early as 1668, Kang Fa·ta proposed a bimetallism in the 
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Central Gold and Silver Act drafted in obedience to an 
Imperial decree and it was looked over by Hsu Ching-teng, 
Chinese Minister to Germany. The following proposals were 
also made: the gold standard plan by Hu Chu-fen in 1895, 
and by Sheng Hsuan·huai in 1896, and the gold pound 
standard plan by Yang I-chih in 1897. None of these plans 
was carried out. The Sheng Hsuan-huai plan was given 
Imperial sanction in February, 1897, but the financial dis-
tress of the Chinese Government during the years before 
and after the war with Japan made its realization impossible. 
But it may be considered that what should be China's cur-
rency reform was suggested during these years, and that the 
attempts made after 1902 were no more than a re-examina-
tion of what had been proposed before. 
The Boxer Uprising of 1900 imposed on China an in-
demnity of 450 million taels. Her indemnity to Japan conse-
quent to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, amounting to 
230 million taels, made China's total indemnity almost 700 
million taels. This great burden coupled with the increasing 
fluctuation of the price of silver and China's recognition of 
the fixing of its currency standard in the treaties with Japan, 
Great Britain and the United States, greatly stimulated the 
currency reform movement. For more than thirty years 
proposals were made and resolutions were passed by both 
Chinese and foreigners. All of these proposals and resolu· 
tions anticipated the inevitability of adopting the gold 
standard. Some of them urged the immediate adoption of 
the gold standard, but the majority of them were in favour 
of the silver standard or the gold exchange standard as a 
step towards the gold standard, pointing to the scarcity of 
gold mines and the import surplus in China's foreign trade. 
The first of such proposals was the gold exchange standard 
plan advocated in. 1903 by an American named Jenks, and 
the subsequent discussions and proposals centered around 
his scheme. China at least twice received similar proposals 
from foreign sources. These were the proposals made by a 
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an American adviser to the Chinese government previously 
referred to in this essay. Although neither of these schemes 
was adopted by China. the plan adopted in November. 1935. 
was based upon the foregoing proposals in favour of the 
gold exchange standard. I have grouped the various pro· 
posals made from 1902 up to the present into (1) the silver 
standard. (2) the gold exchange standard and (3) the gold 
standard. I have further grouped them into (1) those made 
by Chinese and (2) those made by foreigners. as follows: 
1. PROPOSALS FOR THE SILVER STANDARD 
(1) CHINESE PLANS 
(a) The Chang Chih·tung plan of 1904.-As has been 
stated. the first attempt at effecting a currency reform in 
China during the 20th century was the Jenks plan of 1903. 
This plan was opposed by another advocated by Chang 
Chih·tung. The latter was similar to the Robert Hart scheme 
which I shall presently take up. The Chang Chih·tung plan 
recognized the inevitability of adopting the gold exchange 
standard in the future. but at the same time favoured the 
unification of the currency under the prevailing silver tael 
standard. Chang Chih·tung tried to carry out his plan 
in his own province of Hupei by way of providing an exam· 
pie for the whole country. but his death put an end to his 
own project. 
(b) The Tang Shao·i plan of 1908.-This plan followed 
the one proposed by Chang Chih·tung. It was not adopted. 
(c) The silver tael standard plan of 1908.-This scheme 
was primarily proposed by such leaders as Chang Chih·tung. 
Yuan Shih·kai and Na Tung and it proposed to adopt as 
the standard currencies the Kupei one·tael and the five· 
chien silver coin. This plan was adopted by imperial edict 
after consultation with the governers. civil and military. of 
the provinces. That is. the silver tael was adopted as the 
standard in competition with the silver yuan. 
- ----------- -- ----
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This plan suggested two proposals: the use of pure 
silver and that of mixed silver. The Government adopted 
the latter plan and fixed its purity at 980 per mille. 
The realization of this plan was desired by foreigners 
as well as by the Chinese, and after the Lang Iun Kung 
Conference resolved the coinage of new currencies, Prince 
Tsai Tse presented his draft of the new currency law to the 
State Ministers' Conference. But the plan failed to material· 
ize because of the death of the Emperor Hsu Ching and the 
repeated political changes, although the new currency law 
had been promulgated. 
(d) The Silver Yuan Standard Plan of 1910.-The silver 
yuan standard was primarily proposed by Prince Tsai Tse 
and was intended to make one yuan silver equal to Kupei 
seven chien and two fen. As has been stated, the silver 
yuan plan was at first overwhelmed by the silver tael stand· 
ard plan, but Prince Tsai Tse refused to give in, pointing 
to the difficulties involved in the latter plan in respect to 
coinage, use and unification. He succeeded in meeting the 
opposition of Yuan Shih·kai to his plan, and after the death 
of Chang Chih·tung, he established the Currency Reform 
Investigation Bureau in order to study the economic condi· 
tions and monetary customs in the currency histories of the 
Powers. He then fundamentally revised the New Legal 
Tender Law which had been based on the silver tael stand· 
ard and already promulgated, and adopted the silver yuan 
standard. According to this plan, the standard currency 
was to be one yuan silver coin which was equal in weight 
to Kupei seven chien and two fen and its grade was 900 
per mille, so that the weight in pure silver was six chien, 
four fen and eight Ii. This plan had the effect of creating 
the Four·Power Consortium, but it also failed to materialize 
because of the opposition of public opinion to the despotism 
of Kang Fa·te and the consequent revolution. 
(e) The Chinese Currency Reform Committee Plan of 
1913.-This plan was decided by the Revolutionary Govern· 
ment in the second year of the Republican regime. The 
I 
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reason for deciding in favour of this plan is explained sub-
stantially as follows in the official statement relating to the 
New National Currency Act: "The experiences of the 
Powers do not recognize bimetallism, but the gold standard, 
which is the most desirable system, cannot be adopted in 
China because of her special circumstances_ On the other 
hand, the gold exchange standard can be adopted by a 
colony which is capable of maintaining its exchange with 
the help of its mother country, but it would be difficult for 
China to maintain her exchange. Thus, the only recourse 
allowed China is to adopt the sil ver standard." 
(0 The National Currency Regulation Plan of 1914.-
The Currency Reform Committee drew up the national cur-
rency regulations by which one yuan, the standard coin, 
was fixed at seven chien two fen and 900 per mille in grade, 
or pure silver of six chien four fen and eight Ii. The re-
form was planned to commence from a district and then 
gradually extend to the whole country, according to the 
following three reasons: (1) the existence of different finan-
cial customs in the various parts of the country due to the 
territorial vastness of China necessitated that the reform be 
commenced from trade ports; (2) the amount of the new 
coins and new bank notes was not sufficient to meet at once 
the demand of the whole country; and (3) the circumstances 
in different parts of the couulry demanded the suitable revi-
sion of the currency regulations to meet the needs of each 
district. This reform, however, proved impossible of reali-
zation. 
(g) The plan of a Chinese scholar in 1913,-The author 
of this plan says that he was a strong advocate of the gold 
exchange standard for China when he was studying in 
England, but the result of his investigations in Chinese trade 
ports after his coming home forced him to admit the im-
possibility of enforcing the gold exchange standard in his 
country, owing to the difficulties in unifying the parity of 
silver and gold and in maintaining the legal price of silver. 
And thus he concludes that the urgent need, accordinglY, is 
----~ 
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the unification of currencies by adopting a temporary silver 
standard, while in the meantime preparations and measures 
are pushed for the future adoption of the gold standard. 
(h) The plan of the 1928 Economic Congress.-In 1928 
the National Government convened an economic congress of 
leading industrial and banking capitalists at Shanghai in 
order to discuss the financial and economic issues which 
were confronting China at that time. This plan was adopted 
by this congress. The plan recognizes as the final system 
the gold standard but tries to unify the currencies by means 
of the prevailing silver dollar for a temporary purpose. 
Thus, this plan abolishes the silver tael. According to this 
plan, the silver dollar is to be 0.6589 Kupei tael. 
(i) The revised silver yuan standard plan of 1933.-The 
Nanking Government abolished the tael and regulated and 
issued a new and uniform standard silver yuan. 
(2) FOREIGN PLANS 
(a) The Hart Plan of 1903.-This plan was made in 1903 
by an Englishman named Robert Hart. He believed that the 
best policy was for China to circulate both silver and copper 
coins in order to maintain the parity of gold and silver and 
thereby prevent the fluctuation of exchange. Thus, he urged 
that the Government should possess the power of coinage, 
continue the traditional tael, chien, fen, Ii as the names and 
units of weight of the new silver coins, and issue four coins, 
one Kupei tael (the grade being 900 per mille), five chien, 
two and half chien, and one chien; fix the exchange rates 
of the new coins and foreign currencies; accept applications 
for conversion by foreigners; and provide the gold coin, 
secured in such conversion, for the settlement of foreign 
debts and for the coinage of gold coins in the future. Thus, 
Robert Hart favoured the silver standard in anticipation of 
the gold exchange standard. 
(b) The Jamiessen Plan of 1903.-This plan was present-
ed by an Englishman named lamiessen in 1903 in his attempt 
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to criticize Jenks's views in favour of the gold exchange 
standard. Jamiessen pointed out that the Jenks plan stressed 
foreign trade and ignored domestic commerce and asserted 
that it was premature for China to adopt such a plan as was 
proposed by Jenks in view of the existing state of affairs in 
that country. He held that the direct object of China's 
curreucy reform was the silver standard and that the gold 
exchange standard should be adopted only after the silver 
standard had been perfected. 
(cl The Wagel Plan of 1915.-This plan is contained in 
Wagel's work entitled "Chinese Currency and Banking ". 
He believed that the greatest difficulty of currency reform 
was not tht; fluctuation of the exchange rates of gold and 
silver, but the lack of unification of domestic currencies. 
Realizing that all economic changes should be made gradually, 
Wagel respected traditional customs and at the same time 
tried to conform to the existing conditions. He was convinced 
that the first step towards currency reform was to adopt the 
silver standard. He urged that the Shanghai tael should be 
made the currency unit and that subsidiary copper coins 
should be unified. 
He advocated a banking system in which the whole 
country was to be divided into several banking districts. The 
bank in each district was to have the right to issue bank 
notes and to be a semi·government institution. The bank 
was to carry out the function of paying and receiving for 
the National Treasury and also was to be empowered to 
supervise domestic banks. His plan was full of wisdom, as 
might be expected from his long stay in China and his deep 
knowledge of the actual operation of the currency system 
in that country. His plan was in sharp contrast with the 
plan advocated by Vissering, who was in favour of establish· 
ing a powerful private bank as the first step towards the 
desired currency reform. 
Cd) The Passeri Plan of 1918.-Passeri was in favour of 
increasing the powers of both the Government and the Bank 
of China as the first step towards currency refonn. His 
84 K. MATSUOKA 
plan called for the adoption of the Peiyang silver yuan as 
the standard currency; the stability of its value was to be 
guaranteed by the Bank of China; and all other banks were 
to be prohibited from issuing bank notes. 
2. PROPOSALS FOR THE GOLD EXCHANGE 
STANDARD 
(1) CHINESE PLANS 
(a) The Finance Department's Plan of 1908.-This plan 
was stimulated by the memorial presented to the Throne in 
1907 by Wang Ta·wein, Chinese Minister to England. It 
was stated in the plan that the adoption of the gold standard 
was impossible in a country like China which lacks adequate 
gold holdings and that the best practical measure was to 
adopt the gold exchange standard. The plan urged in pre-
paration for this currency reform the issuance of gold notes 
with the silver holdings as security. It is said that this plan 
was based on the views of an American expert named 
Samuel Ingram. Gold certificates were to be issued either 
by the Mint or the National Treasury from time to time as 
necessity demanded, and upon request for conversion, silver 
bullion was to be given at the gold value of its market 
price. It was thought that a period of six or seven years 
was needed for the execution of this plan. 
(b) The Sheng Hsuan-huai Plan of 1908.-Sheng Hsuan-
huai presented the State Currency Plan in 1908 by which he 
recommended to the Government the following measures: to 
stabilize the currencies with silver as the standard; to adopt 
the gold exchange standard; and to stabilize exchange by 
means of specie holdings abroad. This plan also made the 
silver dollar the standard currency, and proposed to issue 
gold conversion notes as well as gold coins, the Bank of 
China to be instrumental in ~ffecting currency reform as the 
central bank of issue_ The Bank of China, however, was to 
be a semi-government organization. 
--~------------ ~--------~~---~ 
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(c) The Chinese Currency Reform Committee Plan of 
1912.-After the National Revolution. China created the Cur-
rency Reform Committee in order to deliberate on the ques-
tion of currency reform_ This committee decided in favour 
of the adoption of the gold exchange standard, the objects 
of which are given as follows: to stabilize exchange; to 
make payments to foreign countries economically more whole-
some; to place the nation's foreign trade in safety; to 
stimulate the inflow of foreign capital, thereby facilitating the 
transition to the gold standard within a definite period of 
time; to make the transfer of silver, with gold as the stand-
ard, appropriate to the economic power of the people; to 
minimize the drastic fall of the value of the silver tael; and 
to avoid the loss of interest due to the hoarding of gold_ 
The plan called for the issuance of silver substitute coins 
for the gold unit. and for the gold reserve exchange fund. 
foreign bonds and other means of international settlement 
were to be used_ As regards the determination of the 
exchange rate between gold and silver. efforts were made to 
approximate the face value of silver coins to their real value 
as far as possible. in order to prevent counterfeiting_ 
(2) FOREIGN PLANS 
(a) The Jenks Plan of 1903_-As has been stated, in 
1903 the Chinese Government asked the advice of the United 
States Government regarding the reform of Chinese currency_ 
In response to this request. the United States created an 
international exchange committee which decided that the 
gold exchange standard was the most suitable system for 
China, and instructed Jenks to recommend it_ This plan 
has remained a subject of active debate down to this very 
day_ Thus, Jenks is the original exponent of the gold ex-
change standard which has remained the main stream of the 
currency reform movement in China during the past thirty 
years. The Jenks plan provided the coinage of silver coins 
for the purpose of domestic circulation_ At the same time. 
------_._--- - ~~-.--- .. 
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gold, fixed at the ratio of 1 to 32 of the silver coins, was 
made the unit of prices. The free coinage of gold coins 
was to be permitted, and the transfer of gold and silver was 
to be made at the official rates. Exchange funds were to be 
maintained in London and other important centres of trade 
in order to maintain the official rates of gold and silver. 
The plan was intended to be put into effect in China's trade 
ports and even in interior regions within a period of five years. 
A hostile attitude to the Jenks plan was manifested be-
cause the plan failed to give due consideration to China's 
domestic commerce and pressed heavily on her foreign trade 
and further because the currency reform was to be managed 
by foreigners. The plan was regarded by Chang Chih-tung 
and other Chinese as an utter disregard of Chinese sover-
eignty' and as an infringement on her financial rights. The 
ratio of 1 to 32 for gold and silver was held by Chinese as 
an attempt to promote foreign interests at the expense of 
the Chinese people. Because of this opposition, the plan 
failed to materialize. 
(b) The Vissering Plan.-Vissering was invited to China 
in 1911 to become an adviser on Chinese currency problems. 
In his book "On Chinese Currency", published in 1912, he 
advocated currency reform through the gradual adoption of 
the gold exchange standard. He divided the time needed for 
the completion of the gold exchange standard system into 
three periods. During the first period, the gold unit was to 
be adopted, a central bank of issue was to be established or 
the Taching Bank to be reorganized into a central bank of 
issue, the gold unit was to be used for the settlement of 
accounts, and new convertible gold bank notes, with gold 
reserves, were to be issued. During the second period, the 
following was to be carried out: the grade, weight and 
purity of substitute silver coins and subsidiary coins to be 
fixed; the gold reserves for substitute silver coins, the coin· 
age of gold coins in case of necessity or the temporary 
substitution of foreign gold coins; the issuance of temporary 
gold notes; the decision of legal tender either by substitute 
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silver coins or gold coins or notes. Finally, during the third 
period, the existing silver tablets and copper coins were to 
be collected, and the old silver dollars to be properly with· 
drawn and disqualified as currency. 
The Vissering Plan was accepted by the Revolutionary 
Government and gave rise to the plan of the Chinese Cur· 
rency Reform Committee of 1912 which we have already 
noted. 
(c) The Kemmerer Plan of 1929.-This plan was present· 
ed by Dr. E. W. Kemmerer, an American to whom reference 
has already several times been made, who was invited to 
become a financial adviser to the National lrllVernment. It 
was ths result of his investigation into the financial and 
monetarY affairs of China for about a year. Kemmerer had 
effected currency reform in more than ten countries includ· 
ing the Philippines, and had come to be known as the 
"Money Doctor ". However, his plan of Chinese currency 
reform drew both praise and condemnation. But the influ· 
ence his plan exercised on China's currency reform is very 
noteworthy. It is said that the recent currency reform is 
the same as the Kemmerer plan, the only difference being 
that the gold exchange is replaced by the pound sterling. 
His report was presented in .. Project of Law for the 
Gradual Introduction of a Gold Standard Currency SYstem 
in China" on November ll, 1929. His report held the view 
that the essence of currency reform in China consisted in 
the adoption of the gold standard and the unification of 
currencies. It was thus in favour of the gradual introduc· 
tion of a gold exchange standard, of with·drawing various 
currencies now in circulation and of enforcing a unified gold 
standard system. The unit of the new gold standard, called 
.. Sun", was to contain 0.60866 gram of pure gold. This is 
approximately the same as the value of the silver yuan. 
No regulations for the coinage of gold coins were contained 
in the report, This is because the circulation and coinage 
of gold coins is not necessary under the gold standard 
. at presen t. 
- --~.--.--~.--- ----.-.. ~----~~-----
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Under this plan, different provinces were to adopt the 
gold standard in succession and the enforcement of the new 
currency system was divided into three stages of time. In 
the first stage, the date of the circulation of the gold stand· 
ard currency was to be announced. After this date, the 
new currencies were to be legally circulated and used in the 
payment of wages, in bank deposits and in all other business 
transactions. Secondly, within one year after the date of the 
circulation of the gold standard currency, the second date, 
for the circulation of the gold standard legal tender, was to 
be announced. After this, the only legal tender would be 
the gold standard currencies. But this second date could 
not be within one year after the first date. It was also 
specified that the second date should be announced at least 
six months before hand. The third date was for the settle· 
ment of debts. After this, all payments in respect of debts 
or other contracts, fixed in the old currencies, were to be 
made in gold coins in the official ratio between the old 
currencies and the gold standard currencies. This official 
ratio was to be decided according to market prices during 
ninety days prior to the announcement period. The an· 
nouncement of this third period might be made simultaneously 
with the date of the gold standard legal tender circulation or 
otherwise, but it could not be made before this date, and 
must be made at least six months before that period. 
(d) The Sassoon Plan of 1935.-This plan is known as 
the Shanghai pound paper money plan and was advocated 
in March, 1935, by Sir Victor Sassoon, an English financier 
in Shanghai. This plan, coupled with the visits made to 
China by Major·General Hammond and Sir Frederick Leith· 
Ross in April and September, respectively, in the same year. 
had a deep influence on Chinese currency reform. Accord· 
ing to this plan. China was to borrow money from England 
to be used as security for issuing the Shanghai pound paper 
money. which was to circulate side by side with the Shanghai 
silver yuan. The Shanghai pound paper money was to be 
secured in London by paying the English pound and in 
--~-~~--~--------~ 
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Shanghai by paying the Shanghai silver yuan at the exchange 
rate on London. The paper money was to be used as a 
substitute for gold notes and for the payment of imports. 
Public opinion in China showed its opposition to the 
Sassoon plan because of its obiectionable political motives. 
Its advocates explained in vain that it was a temporary 
measure to serve only until the time when the American 
policy of purchasing silver should be changed. 
(e) The Kwanchin Currency Plan of 1935.-Because of 
the unpopularity of the Sassoon plan, the National Govern· 
ment issued the Kwanchin Currency, by which it tried to 
remove the heavy pressure placed on the commercial, indust· 
rial and financial circles in Shanghai. Kwanchin notes were 
issued to the amount of 200 million yuan using English 
credit as reserves. Thus, the National Government attempted 
to adopt an abnormal gold exchange standard. 
There are other plans in favour of the gold standard 
or bimetallism. The following are those which were proposed 
by Chinese. 
3. PROPOSALS FOR THE GOLD STANDARD 
(al The Hu WeHe Plan of 1904.-This plan was pre· 
sented by Hu Wei·te, Chinese Minister to Russia, in opposi. 
tion to the Jenks plan. He held that, since China is the only 
non·gold country in the world, all other countries being gold 
countries, the only way to protect China's foreign trade is 
to circulate gold coins inasmuch as the high price of gold 
and the low price of silver are iniurious to a country having 
the silver standard. He pointed to the fact that Japan spent 
ten years in collecting gold in preparation for the adoption 
of the gold standard, and urged that China do the same. 
He advocated the plan of collecting the gold hoarded by the 
people and expressed. his own opinion that this can be 
brought about by selling government posts. 
(b) The Yang Shih·hsiang plan of 1907.-This plan 
which was made by Yang Shih·hsiang, Governor of Chili 
Province, was intended to minimize the loss due to China's 
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payment of the Boxer indemnity in gold coins, by commg 
gold coins at the Teintsin Mint. He secured the sanction 
of the State Ministers but failed to convince Chang Shih·tung, 
who criticized it as defeating its own purpose, and who ad-
vocated the development of gold mines, rather than the coin-
ing of gold money, for the solution of the problem. 
(c) The Wang Ta-hsieh Plan of 1907.-In 1907 Wang 
Ta-hsieh, Chinese Minister to England, proposed the im-
mediate adoption of the gold standard in order to cope with 
the prevailing unrest due to failure in effecting currency 
reform. But his plan was rejected by the Finance Depart-
ment which laid stress on the desirability of adoPtinlf the 
gold exchange standard. 
(d) The Prince Tsai Tse Plan of 1908_-Prince Tsai 
Tse, who was opposed to the decision of the Government to 
adopt the silver tael standard, advocated by Chag Shih-tung 
and his followers in 1908, proposed the adoption of the gold 
standard at the Langjunyuan Congress, seeing that the high 
officials of the Government were in favour of the gold stand-
ard_ He also announced a plan of preparation to he followed 
by a gradual process of adoption over a period of ten years. 
He thereby tried to obstruct the enforcement of the silver 
tael standard_ 
(e) The Tsao Ju-lin Plan of 1918.-The question of adopt-
ing the gold standard in China was revived by Tsao Ju-lin, 
Minister of Finance, who advocated the issuance of gold 
notes based on the gold yuan having 0.752318 gram of pure 
gold. He pointed out, as the chief reason for his plan, the 
fact that one third of the budgetary estimates of the Chinese 
""Government constituted interest payments on foreign loans 
and indemnity payments, all of which were based on the 
gold standard; that the fluctuation of the price of silver is 
detrimental to China's foreign trade; and that all foreign 
countries in actuality had the gold standard. This plan was 
materialized in the form of gold note regulations in August 
of the same year. It was provided that Japan was to assist 
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which were to be deposited with the Bank of Japan as 
reserves against which gold notes were to be issued. At 
this very juncture, a nation-wide boycott against Japan arose 
in China and leaders of the boycott movement made loud 
cries against the foolishness of having conversion reserves in 
a foreign country. This objection stopped the realization of 
the Tsao Ju-lin plan. The gold notes regulations provided 
that gold notes were to be issued by a bank designated by 
the Currency Bureau and that the gold note unit was the 
gold yuan having 0.752318 gram of pure gold. 
(0 The Peng Hsueh·pei Plan of 1934.-This plan was 
presented to the National Economic Congress in March, 1934, 
by Peng Hsueh·pei, who asserted that preparations for the 
adoption of the gold standard were absolutely necessary for 
the adjustment of the nation's foreign trade and the equili· 
brium of payments. The plan failed to materialize, first, 
because of the fact that many nations had already discarded 
the gold standard by 1934, due to the worldwide economic 
depression, and, secondly, because the plan itself lacked the 
scientific basis necessary for its actualization. 
In addition to the foregoing proposals the following may 
also be mentioned: bimetallism proposed by an Austrian 
expert named Schwarzwald in 1913; a similar plan advanced 
by Mr. J. F. Darling, director of the Midland Bank, who 
urged that a new currency unit of .. Rex" should be created. 
The latter proposal, it should be noted, was not limited to 
China. 
Nor should we forget plans formulated by Japanese, for 
they have played an important part in China's currency re-
form. In 1889 Baron Sakatani proposed bimetallism as against 
the gold standard plan proposed by Kang Fa·te. He later 
suggested the gold standard when Na Tung and Jenks paid 
a visit to Japan in 1903. Again, in the Shanghai China 
Gazette in 1911, and in the Financial News in 1912, he ad· 
vised China to adopt the gold standard after the American 
pattern. In the same year, the Tokyo Clearing House sug-
gested the customs gold standard, and in 1918 the Tokyo 
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Chamber of Commerce also suggested a plan based on the 
gold standard, At that time a keen interest was shown in 
Chinese currency reform by many Japanese economists and 
financial experts such as Toda, Kawada and Sakuda, alI of 
whom engaged in active discussion of the problem. But I 
regret I have no space here for the presentation of their 
views. 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINESE CURRENCY 
REFORM 
As has been pointed out, China's currency reform was 
first examined in its embryonic stage immediately after the 
Sino·Japanese War of 1894-5, and was re·examined after 1900. 
This re·examination was caused by China's recognition, in 
treaties with Japan, England and the United States, that she 
must decide her currency standard, and also by the fact that 
the payment of the Boxer indemnity and her import surplus 
had the effect of depreciating the price of silver and thereby 
oppressing Chinese economy. It is easy to see, therefore, that 
the ultimate object of this re-examination was the gold cur· 
rency standard. Thus, a memorial, concerning the adoption 
of the silver yuan standard, presented to the Chinese ruler 
in 1908, stated: .. If we are to follow the general trend of 
the world, the adoption of the gold currency standard is 
highly desirable". Again, the official declaration issued in 
the same year praised the gold standard in the following 
words: .. All nations adopt the gold standard and have 
various silver coins as subsidiary currencies. Their system 
is highly minute and very convenient in circulation ". But 
then why is it that the gold standard was not actually 
adopted? The answer is given by the following quotation: 
" A vast expense will be required for the adoption of the 
gold standard, and the gold exchange standard involves many 
risks". Moreover, China in actuality had the copper stand· 
ard at that time, and the sane policy seemed to be to adopt 
the silver currency standard rather than to make a leap to 
._--.... _--._----
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the gold standard. This is more fully explained by Chang 
Shih·tung as follows: 
.. In the commercial ports and cities along the coast, 
seventy or eighty per cent. of the people use silver coins 
and twenty or thirty p~r cent. use copper coins. Silver and 
copper coins are used side by side by the people in the 
markets along the Yangtze River. But in provinces and 
prefectures to the north and the south of the Yangtze River, 
the ratio is one for silver and nine for copper coins. In some 
of these provinces, ninety·five per cent. of the people use 
copper coins and only one per cent. use silver coins. In 
other words, although silver and copper coins are used side 
by side in China, the area in which copper coins are used 
is ten times that in which silver coins are used. On the 
other hand, all State expenditures are calculated in silver, 
while civilian expenditures are expressed in copper coins. 
Although foreigners regard China as a silver country, in 
reality our country is one of the copper countries." 
The desire to adopt the silver standard was realized in 
1910 when the New Chinese Revised State Currency Regula-
tions were promulgated and the silver yuan currency standard 
was adopted thereby. But it is unmistakable that its future 
object was to introduce the gold currency standard. Shang 
Hsuan-huai's plan provided a period of two years for its 
completion while the period required by Prince Tsai Tse's 
scheme was ten years, but both plans had identically the 
same object. 
All these plans can be roughly grouped into those pro-
posed from the Chinese standpoint and those proposed from 
the foreign standpoint. Some of the former advocated the 
adoption of the silver standard, and others, the gold exchange 
standard, while stiII others were in favour of the adoption 
of the gold standard. But the great majority of the Chinese 
plans were in favour of the adoption of the silver standard, 
because all these plans had the common object of adjusting 
the existing currency system through the adoption of the 
silver standard. On the other hand, the plans for the adop-I --~---------- --------------- -- -----------~--.... 
-- ------
94 K. MATSUOKA 
tion of the gold exchange standard, proposed by foreigners, 
tended to have as their object the security of indemnities 
and loans to China. Many of the plans for the adoption of 
the silver standard proposed by foreigners were intended to 
further the exchange and commercial interests of their own 
home countries. Moreover, China's desire to effect her cur· 
rency reform by her own self·initiated and independent 
efforts led her to reject the plans for the adoption of the 
gold exchange standard proposed by many foreign financial 
experts. Thus, viewed from the Chinese standpoint, the gold 
exchange standard came to be regarded as a system of 
.. forceful appropriation by deceiving people in calculation .. 
(a quotation from the memorial presented to the Throne by 
Chang Shih·tung). And yet China could not help resorting 
to this same system of the gold exchange standard, which 
was once regarded as the above quotation indicates; first, 
because Chinese economy failed to bring about its develop· 
ment by its own initiative and power, in accordance with 
the orthodox ideas of the capitalist system of economy; 
and, secondly, because China had sought as the ultimate 
object of her currency reform the gold standard. 
China's judgment of the currency standard in the early 
stage of her currency reform movement was thus correct to 
some extent. But because of her vacillation and suspicion, 
she was unable to achieve the normal development of her 
national economy and, in the present economic depression, 
was forced to resort to the currency standard which she 
had regarded as a national enemy, being too severely pressed 
by national necessity to question the merits and demerits of 
the system. Primarily, the gold exchange standard is opera-
ted by backward capitalist countries having no gold mines 
of importance with which to make preparation for their 
adoption of the gold standard. For this reason, a country 
wishing to adopt the gold exchange standard should so 
operate its economy as to make the adoption of that system 
a means of securing greater advantages in its foreign econo· 
mic relations. Whether a nation succeeds in this economic 
-------------------------------
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policy decides the fate of the gold exchange standard. 
Up to the time of the presentation of the Jenks plan, 
China's attitude towards her currency reform was one of friend· 
liness towards other nations, and she scrupulously respected 
international treaties and showed a willingness to cooperate 
with others in dealing with the problem of the international 
currency standard. It will be recalled that the Jenks plan 
was regarded as beneficial to foreign countries, and Chang 
Shih·tung stated in criticizing it that .. an independent and 
self·supporting nation should not permit foreign interference 
in the problems of its finance ". But China's wish to solve 
the question of the international currency standard through 
international cooperation is best shown by the following 
events. In January, 1903, the Chinese Government instructed 
the Chinese Charge d'Affaires at Washington' to request, to· 
gether with the Mexican Minister to the United States, the 
American Government to suggest means for making good 
the loss in international exchange resulting from the fluctua· 
tion of the ratio between gold and silver. China also sent 
both Prince Tsai Tse and Na Tung to Japan to ascertain 
Japanese views regarding the same probl,em. 
In view of this attitude on the part of China, the United 
States and other countries wished to assist her in the solu-
tion of the problem, but the opposition by some Chinese 
leaders to international cooperation led China to confine her-
self in the shell of the silver standard. This circumstance 
is a very deplorable event in the history of Chinese curren-
cy reform. 
Of course, it is clear that the gold exchange standard 
inevitably possesses a highly monopolistic and somewhat 
oppressive element, when it is operated from the standpoint 
of financial capitalism. China had had several opportunities 
for effec.iing her currency reform before it became too serious 
for any further delay, but she lost these opportunities because 
of her suspicion of the motives of foreign powers. This is 
highly deplorable, especially in view of her earlier attitude 
of international cooperation. China failed in her attempt at 
,.-- ... ~--------.... - .. --, .. " •... -.-.-.. -.-------.. 
. - -_ .. __ .. _. - ---
96 K. MATSUOKA 
effecting currency reform, in spite of her realization of the 
necessity of adopting the gold standard in the early stage of 
her reform movement, because she neglected to develop her 
national economy and improve her international accounts by 
her own efforts and regarded with suspicion the gold ex· 
change standard which alone she could have operated to her 
best advantage. The fact that China placed undue import· 
ance on her own power and failed to follow the principles 
of the capitalist system of economic organization are the 
chief reasons for her failure in effecting the needed currency 
reform. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To summarize: In the early stage of her currency reo 
form movement, China had the right conception of the nature 
of the gold standard but she came to show an attitude of 
suspicion and vacillation towards the gold exchange standard 
which she had to adopt before passing on to the gold stand· 
ard. Moreover, Chinese economy was sacrificed upon the 
altar of rivalry among the Chinese military leaders, and this 
obstructed the development of the natural resources of China 
as a backward capitalist nation. She was then caught in 
the maelstrom of the world·depression. All these factors are 
responsible for the recent currency reform. 
While China has been showing suspicion and vacillation. 
Japan's gold exchange standard has been put into successful 
operation in Korea. The Tokyo gold yen entered Manchuria 
through the Bank of Chosen and after the establishment of 
Manchoukuo it made union with the currency of Japan. Its 
future is bright indeed. Viewed from the standpoint of inter· 
national finance, this success of the Japanese yen certainly 
irritated British economy more than Chinese economy, and 
forced England to become very anxious to dig her last 
financial trench in China. The Nanking Government. whose 
economic policy towards Japan has failed, perceived the new 
situation and realizing the inevitability of the collapse of the 
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country, allowed England to occupy the last line of the 
Chinese financial defence, In other words, China entrusted 
the work of adopting the gold exchange standard to England. 
Great indeed is the significance of this event for international 
finance. At present the details regarding the nature of the 
proposed pound gold exchange standard are not available, 
but there is no doubt that British economy will be the chief 
supporter of this currency system. At present the Chinese 
currency standard is linked to the pound and China is thus 
urged to participate in the so·called sterling bloc. 
Some may say that so long as the Japanese yen also 
belongs to the sterling bloc, Japan's relations towards England 
are the same as China's. Of course, the waters of the 
Haungpukiang are in communication with those of the 
Thames, just as our Sumida River is. But the significance 
of the operation of the Japanese currency in the Far East, 
and in consequence its operation on Chinese economy, is not 
the same as the operation of the English pound on the same 
economy, although the Tokyo gold yen is in communication 
with the sterling bloc. Both the Tokyo gold yen and the 
English pound are gold exchanges in the prevailing system 
of capitalist economy. But there is this difference between 
the two currencies: whereas the English pound is purely 
capitalistic in pattern, the Tokyo gold yen has recently shown 
a deviation in its purity so far as its operation in the Far 
East, especially in China, is concerned, This deviation is an 
indication of what Japan has been doing and what she is 
intending to do in the Far East. 
One may therefore say that China fell into the pit against 
which she had been on her guard from the very beginning 
of her currency reform, when she cast her lot with the 
purely capitalistic English pound, in combating the economic 
depression. The fears and vacillation China has shown as 
regards her currency reform should have been directed 
against the English pound, but the reality is just the opposite 
of such a sane policy. And China is about to become an 
area of rivalry between the English pound and the Tokyo 
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gold yen. 
There is another currency which should have entered 
the ring. That is the American dollar. As has been pointed 
out, the immediate cause of the present complication in 
China is the determined enforcement of the American policy 
of purchasing silver. China was full of apprehension of the 
dire consequences of this policy upon her economy as soon 
as it was announced by the American Government and 
appealed to it for reconsideration, but her protest was in 
vain. Thus, it was the United States that misguided China 
in the latter's currency reform. The policies on whicn the 
United States has been laying much emphasis in recent years 
are domestic rather than international. In view of this fact, 
it is unthinkable that the United States will extend a posi-
tive aid to China in any near future. But this does not 
mean that the New York dollar has forgotten China alto-
gether, for its activity in China is only circumscribed by the 
special circumstances of the United States. 
It may further be observed that neither France nor the 
Netherlands lacks qualifications to participate in the problem 
of the gold exchange standard in China. Although these 
countries are the principal members of the gold bloc, they 
are too busily engaged in the work of maintaining their 
respective standards at home to take a hand in affairs of 
another nation. Consequently, no positive participation is 
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